WHAT DOES GOD THINK OF THE BELIEVER'S SIN?

Is it God's will that His people sin? Paul writes: "Now may the God of peace Himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved complete, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. 5:23 NASB). In another place he writes: "For this is the will of God, your sanctification; that is, that you abstain from sexual immorality; that each of you know how to possess his own vessel in sanctification and honor, not in lustful passion, like the Gentiles who do not know God" (1 Thess. 4:3-4 NASB). Arminius writes:

[Sanctification] is a gracious act of God, by which He purifies man who is a sinner, and yet a believer, from the darkness of ignorance, from indwelling sin and from its lusts or desires, and imbues him with the Spirit of knowledge, righteousness and holiness; that, being separated from the life of the world and made conformable to God, man may live the life of God, to the praise of the righteousness and of the glorious grace of God, and to his own salvation.
Therefore this sanctification consists in these two things: In the death of "the old man, who is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts:" And in the quickening or enlivening of "the new man, who after God is created in righteousness and the holiness of truth."
The Author of sanctification is God the Father Himself, in His Son who is the Holy of holies, through the Spirit of holiness. The External Instrument is the word of God; the Internal one is faith yielded to the word preached: For the word does not sanctify, only as it is preached, unless the faith be added by which the hearts of men are purified. . . .
This sanctification is not completed in a single moment; but sin, from whose dominion we have been delivered through the cross and the death of Christ is weakened more and more by daily losses, and the inner man is day by day renewed more and more, while we carry about with us in our bodies the death of Christ, and the outward man is perishing.¹

But if God has foreordained (merely decreed) all things which come to pass, has He not also foreordained (merely decreed) the sins of His redeemed people? For if God cannot foreknow the sins of His children, but must sovereignly foreordain (decree) whatsoever comes to pass (in the effort to be sovereign), then He must have also chosen which sins His children commit. Arminius responds to such nonsense:

The will of God is borne towards its objects in the following order: (1.) He wills Himself. (2.) He wills all those things which, out of infinite things possible to Himself, He has by the last judgment of His wisdom determined to be made. And First, He wills to make them to be; then He is affected towards them by His will, according as they possess some likeness with His nature, or some vestige of it. (3.) The third object of the will of God are those things which He judges fit and equitable to be done by creatures who are endowed with understanding and with free will: In which is included a prohibition of that which He wills not to be done. (4.) The fourth object of the divine will is His permission [a thing which Calvin denied], that chiefly by which He permits a rational creature to do what He has prohibited, and to omit what He has commanded. (5.) He wills those things which, according to His own wisdom, He judges to be done concerning the acts of His rational creatures.²

Classical Arminianism denies that God could have foreordained by decree the sins of anyone, let alone those of His own people. Arminius continues:

Adam sinned freely and voluntarily, without any necessity, either internal or external. Adam did not fall through the decree of God, neither through being ordained to fall nor through desertion, but through the mere permission of God, which is placed in subordination to no predestination either to salvation or to death, but which belongs to providence so far as it is distinguished in opposition to predestination.³

The apostle John writes: "My little children, I am writing these things to you so that you may not sin" (1 John 2:1a). What God desires is for His children to abstain from sinning. Practically and biblically speaking, it is clear that God does not always get what He desires. In the same manner, He desires "all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:4 TNIV), but that will not be accomplished.

Now, if one of God's born again children do sin, he or she has "an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous" (1 John 2:1b). Jesus is the One who mediates between sinful humanity and God (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5). If God's people confess their sins, "He is faithful and righteous to forgive" their sins (1 John 1:9). But what does God think about the believer's sin? Certainly, God still hates the sins of His elect. Arminius writes: "God is not willing to impute sin to believers, or to place sin against them, but is desirous to pardon it; although with this difference, that it requires express penitence from some, while concerning others it is content with this expression, 'Who can understand his errors? Cleanse thou me, O Lord, from secret faults' (Psalm 19:12)."⁴

Paul reminds us: "What shall we say then? Are we to continue in sin so that grace may increase? [Having just declared that where sin increased, God's grace abounded, Rom. 5:20.] May it never be! How shall we who died to sin still live in it?" (Rom. 6:1-2 NASB). Though the believer has been justified by faith in Jesus Christ, the believer's sin is still obnoxious to God's holiness. Thus we must break free from it ~ knowing that "if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed" (John 8:36); and, "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery" (Gal. 5:1 TNIV).

1 James Arminius, "Seventy-Nine Private Disputations: Disputation XLIX. On the Sanctification of Man," in The Works of Arminius, Vol. II, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 408-10.

2 Ibid., 343-44.

3 Arminius, 2:716.

4 Ibid., 160.

SATURDAY DEVOTION: ARMINIUS "ON RECONCILING RELIGIOUS DISSENSIONS AMONG CHRISTIANS"

"Indeed, all these enmities, schisms, persecutions, and wars, are commenced, carried on, and conducted, with the greater animosity, on account of every one considering his adversary as the most infectious and pestilent fellow in the whole Christian world, a public incendiary, a murderer of souls, an enemy of God, and a servant of the devil, as a person who deserves to be suddenly smitten and consumed by fire descending from heaven ~ and as one, whom it is not only lawful to hate, to curse and to murder without incurring any guilt, but whom it is also highly proper to treat in that manner, and to be entitled to no slight commendation for such a service ~ because no other work appears in his eyes to be more acceptable to God, of greater utility in the salvation of man, more odious to Satan, or more pernicious to his kingdom.

"Such a sanguinary zealot professes to be invited, instigated and constrained to deeds like these, by a zeal for the house of God, for the salvation of men, and for the Divine glory. This conduct of violent partisans is what was predicted by the Judge and the Master of our religion: "When they shall persecute you and kill you for My sake, they will think that they do God service" (John 16:2). When the very conscience therefore arouses, assists and defends the affections, no obstacle can offer a successful resistance to their impetuosity. Thus we see that Religion itself, through the vicious corruption of men has been made a cause of dissension, and has become the field in which they may perpetually exercise themselves in cruel and bloody contests.

"If, in addition to these things, some individual arrogate to himself, and, with the consent of a great multitude, usurp authority to prescribe laws with respect to religion, to strike with the thunder-bolt of excommunication whomsoever he pleases, to dethrone kings, to absolve subjects from their oaths of allegiance and fidelity, to arm them against their lawful rulers, to transfer the right over the dominions of one prince to others who are his sworn confederates, or to such as are prepared to seize upon them in the first instance, to pardon crimes however great their enormity may be, and whether already perpetrated or to be hereafter committed, and to canonize ruffians and assassins ~ the mere nod of such a man as is here described must be instantly obeyed with blind submission, as if it were the command of God! ~ Blessed God! What a quantity of most inflammable matter is thus thrown upon the fire of enmities, persecutions, and wars! What an Iliad of disasters is thus introduced into the Christian world! It is therefore not without just reason that a man may exclaim, 'Is it possible that Religion can have persuaded men to introduce this great mass of evils?'

"But all the ills which we have enumerated do not only proceed from real dissensions, in which some fundamental truth is the subject of discussion, but also from those which are imaginary, when things affect the mind not as they are in reality, but according to their appearances. . . .

"But, to close this part of my discourse, the very summit and conclusion of all the evils which arise from religious discord is the destruction of that very religion about which all the controversy has been raised. Indeed, religion experiences almost the same fate, as the young lady mentioned by Plutarch, who was addressed by a number of suitors; and when each of them found that she could not become entirely his own, they divided her body into parts, and thus not one of them obtained possession of her whole person.

"This is the nature of discord, to disperse and destroy matters of the greatest consequence. Of this a very mournful example is exhibited to us in certain extensive dominions and large kingdoms, the inhabitants of which were formerly among the most flourishing professors of the Christian Religion . . . ."

James Arminius, "On Reconciling Religious Dissensions Among Christians," in The Works of Arminius, Vol. 1, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 451-53.

THE CONTROVERSIAL JACOBUS ARMINIUS

What typically denominates an individual as controversial is not necessarily the truth which he or she promotes but the manner in which one argues against an established dogma. The reason why Arminius was so controversial in his time was because the truth which he proclaimed was at variance with an established form of Calvinism in Holland. John Calvin was not controversial merely due to the "hard truth" which he proclaimed. Nearly everyone within his theological circle (Reformed) agreed with his teachings. What kind of controversy could possibly be caused by someone whose teachings are nearly unanimously agreed upon by a majority of people?

James Arminius, on the other hand, resisted the Calvinism of his day and this stirred up quite a bit of controversy. If, as Mark Talbot admits, "any time you clearly speak Christian truth, you will necessarily arouse opposition", then there can be no wonder as to why Arminius was baptized in controversy. Roger Olson remarks: "Readers should remember that Arminius was under tremendous assault and was extremely frustrated; during his career as a theologian virtually all of his time was devoted to responding to accusations and charges of heresy. And the rhetoric of the Calvinists . . . was no less harsh."¹

Those who resisted Arminius were Supralapsarian Calvinists such as Franciscus Gomarus. Arminius responds to the Supralapsarians:

1. The first opinion, which I reject, but which is espoused by those . . . who assume the very highest ground of this. The opinion of those who take the highest ground on this point, as it is generally contained in their writings, is to this effect:
(1) God by an eternal and immutable decree has predestinated [think Unconditional Election], from among men (whom He did not consider as being then created, much less as being fallen), certain individuals to everlasting life, and others to eternal destruction, without any regard whatever to righteousness or sin, to obedience or disobedience, but purely of His own good pleasure, to demonstrate the glory of His justice and mercy; or (as others assert), to demonstrate His saving grace, wisdom and free uncontrollable power.²

Supralapsarians such as Arminius's mentor, John Calvin's successor and son-in-law, Theodore Beza (and modern day Calvinists such as John Piper) insisted that God's first decree was to elect and reprobate. Subsequently, He then decreed to create human beings in order to effect the first decree. Arminius could abide no hint of an alleged secret decree of God, whereby He unconditionally chose to save a few individuals, reprobating the majority of humankind. The following are reasons for his intolerance of such a doctrine:

1. It is not the foundation of Christianity:
(1) For this Predestination [think Unconditional Election] is not that decree of God by which Christ is appointed by God to be the Savior, the Head, and the Foundation of those who will be made heir of salvation. Yet that decree is the only foundation of Christianity.
(2) For the doctrine of this Predestination is not that doctrine by which, through faith, we as lively stones are built up into Christ, the only corner stone, and are inserted into Him as the members of the body are joined to their head.
2. It is not the foundation of Salvation:
(1) For this Predestination is not that decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ Jesus on which alone our salvation rests and depends.
(2) The doctrine of this Predestination is not the foundation of Salvation: for it is not "the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth" [Rom. 1:16]: because through it "the righteousness of God" is not "revealed from faith to faith" [cf. Rom. 1:17].
3. Nor is it the foundation of the certainty of salvation: For that is dependent upon this decree, "they who believe, shall be saved": I believe, therefore, I shall be saved. But the doctrine of Predestination embraces within itself neither the first nor the second member of the syllogism.
This is likewise confessed by some persons in these words: "we do not wish to state that the knowledge of this [Predestination] is the foundation of Christianity or of salvation, or that it is necessary to salvation in the same manner as the doctrine of the Gospel," etc.³

Contrast that latter statement with Spurgeon's inaccurate assessment that Calvinism is the Gospel. It is quite clear that Jesus is the Gospel. Even John Piper has noted that God is the Gospel. Thus neither Calvinism nor Arminianism is the Gospel proper. These theological systems are merely the presentation of the Gospel. Arminius boldly claims:

This doctrine of Predestination [i.e. Unconditional Election] comprises within it neither the whole nor any part of the Gospel. For, according to the tenor of the discourses delivered by John and Christ, as they are described to us by the Evangelist, and according to the doctrine of the Apostles and Christ after His ascension, the Gospel consists partly of an injunction to repent and believe, and partly of a promise to bestow forgiveness of sins, the grace of the Spirit, and life eternal. But this Predestination belongs neither to the injunction to repent and believe, nor to the annexed promise. Nay, this doctrine does not even teach what kind of men in general God has predestinated [i.e. believers], which is properly the doctrine of the Gospel; but it embraces within itself a certain mystery, which is known only to God, who is the Predestinater, and in which mystery are comprehended what particular persons and how many he has decreed to save and to condemn.
From these premises I draw a further conclusion, that this doctrine of Predestination is not necessary to salvation, either as an object of knowledge, belief, hope, or performance. A Confession to this effect has been made by a certain learned man, in the theses which he has proposed for discussion on this subject, in the following words: "Wherefore the gospel cannot be simply termed the book or the revelation of Predestination, but only in a relative sense. Because it does not absolutely denote either the matter of the number or the form; that is, it neither declares how many persons in particular, nor (with a few exceptions) who they are, but only the description of them in general, whom God has predestinated."⁴

The University of Leiden, where Arminius was professor, was inundated with Infra- and Supralapsarian Calvinists. However, Arminius thought that these forms of Calvinism were not being true to Augustinianism proper, and he longed to set the record straight. Hence, controversy ensued. He highly regarded John Calvin, stating,

Next to the study of the Scriptures which I earnestly inculcate, I exhort my pupils to peruse Calvin's Commentaries, which I extol in loftier terms than Helmich himself; for I affirm that he excels beyond comparison in the interpretation of Scripture, and that his commentaries ought to be more highly valued than all that is handed down to us by the library of the fathers . . . but with discrimination, like the writings of all men.⁵

Arminius was not the anti-Calvin. As a matter of fact, Olson notes:

Arminius always considered himself Reformed and in the line of the great Swiss and French Reformers Zwingli, Calvin and Bucer. He studied under Calvin's successor Beza in Geneva and was given a letter of recommendation by him to the Reformed church of Amsterdam [where he was pastor for fifteen years]. It seems highly unlikely that the chief pastor of Geneva and principle of its Reformed academy would not know the theological inclinations of one of his star pupils. . . .
Arminius always thought of himself as Reformed in a broad sense. To his way of thinking high Calvinism [supralapsarianism] was just one branch of Reformed theology; he belonged to another. That did not make him less Reformed. [Carl] Bangs disagrees with [Calvinist] Richard Miller, who argues that Arminius and his theology represent a radical departure from Reformed thought. For Bangs, Arminius and his theology represent a variety of Reformed thought, even if it is outside the mainstream. Arminianism is a correction of Reformed theology rather than a departure from it. "Arminius stands firmly in the tradition of Reformed theology in insisting that salvation is by grace alone and that human ability or merit must be excluded as a cause of salvation. It is faith in Christ alone that places a sinner in the company of the elect." The correction lies in Arminius's rejection of strict monergism, which many have come to equate with Reformed theology itself.⁶

Though buffeted on all sides by various Calvinists, Arminius was certainly tenacious, which only stirred further controversy with his theological opponents. Never was he reticent or timid in declaring what he thought the Bible clearly teaches, and never would he back down from his theological opponents. And yet he did so in such a mild, calm (i.e. godly) manner, that if someone resorted to ad hominem the argument against his character would be immediately dismissed. He was known by all for his unblemished disposition and character. Though his theology was controversial to Supralapsarian Calvinists, his temperament was not ~ he was praised even by his opponents for his genial posture.

1 Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2006), 102.

2 Robert F. Lay, Readings in Historical Theology: Primary Sources of the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic & Professional, 2009), 262.

3 Ibid., 265-66.

4 Ibid., 266.

5 Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 8 vols. (1907-10; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952-53), 8:280.

6 Olson, 48-49.

ARMINIUS ON THE ELECT & THE NON-ELECT

Arminius was accused of teaching, The grace sufficient for salvation is conferred on the Elect and on the Non-Elect; that, if they will (from their own will and power), they may believe or not believe, may be saved or not be saved. He answered his critics thus:

Our brethren here also manifest the same negligence. They take no pains to know what my sentiments are; they are not careful in examining what truth there is in my opinions; and they exercise no discretion about the words in which they enunciate my sentiments and their own. They know that I use the word "Election" in two senses: (1) For the decree by which God resolves to justify believers and to condemn unbelievers and which is called by the Apostle, "the purpose of God according to election" (Rom. 9.11), and (2) For the decree by which He resolves to elect these or those nations and men with the design of communicating to them the means of faith, but to pass by other nations and men.
Yet without this distinction, they fasten these sentiments on me; when, by its aid, I am enabled to affirm, not only "Sufficient Grace is conferred on, or rather is offered to, the Elect and the Non-Elect;" but also, "Sufficient Grace is not offered to any except the Elect."
"It is offered to the Elect and the Non-Elect," because it is offered to unbelievers, whether they will afterwards believe or not believe. "It is offered to none except the Elect," because, by that very thing which is offered to them, they cease to be of the number of those of whom it is said, "He suffered them to walk in their own ways" (Acts 14.16); and, "He hath not dealt so with any nation" (Psalm 147.20). And who shall compel me to use words of their prescribing unless proof be brought from Scripture that the words are to be thus and in no other way received?
I now proceed to the other words of the [accusation]: "That, if they will, they may believe or not believe, be saved or not saved." I say, in two different senses may these words be received, "If they will, they may believe," that is . . . as they are excited and assisted by this grace. "Or they may not believe," while rejecting this grace by their own free will, and resisting it. "They may be saved or not saved," that is, saved by the admission and right use of grace, not saved by their own wickedness, rejecting that without which they cannot be saved.
To the whole together I reply, that nothing is declared in these words, in whatever manner they may be understood, which St. Augustine himself and his followers would not willingly have acknowledged as true: I say, in these words are enunciated the very sentiments of St. Augustine; yet he was the chief champion against the Pelagian heresy, being accounted in that age its most successful combatant.
For in his Treatise On Nature and Grace, St. Augustine speaks thus: "Since he is everywhere subservient to Him as his Lord, can call him who is averse, can teach a believer, can comfort him who hopes, can exhort the diligent man, can aid him who strives, and can lend an attentive ear to him who deprecates; it is not imputed to thee as a fault, that thou art unwillingly ignorant, but that thou neglect to inquire after that of which thou art ignorant; not that thou dost not collect and bind together the shattered and wounded members, but that thou despises Him who is willing to heal thee" (Works of Arminius, Vol. II, 53-54).

Augustine's point is well taken: God is not so much angry at those who are "unwillingly ignorant" as He is toward those who despise Him who is "willing to heal" them (cf. Matt. 13:15). This type of language suggests that God is more than willing to save those who will not harden their hearts toward Him (cf. Ezekiel 18.32; 33.11; Matt. 23.37-39; Heb. 3.7-11); though my intention is not one of misrepresenting Augustine's view of predestination. We are all well aware that Calvinism is a more defined and better constructed form of Augustinianism.

Arminius did not view God as "trying His best" to save sinners but failing miserably (as is caricatured by so many Calvinists). Since it has always been God's desire and pleasure to see "all people . . . saved and . . . come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:4 TNIV), then what God has decreed is to grace sinners (Eph. 2:8) by the Spirit's conviction (John 16:8-11) and the power of the gospel (Rom. 1:16-17), enabling them (John 6:44, 65) to come to Jesus Christ for salvation by faith in Him (Rom. 5:5; Heb 11.6).

Therefore Grace is conferred upon the elect and the non-elect. It is said to be conferred upon the elect, because those who trust in Christ Jesus are the elect of God. It is also said to be conferred upon the non-elect, because, though they willingly refuse to trust in Christ Jesus and remain condemned (John 3:36), by the Spirit's attestation (John 16:8-11) it can be said that they received the grace of God in vain (2 Cor. 6:1).

Though this Theology of Grace deviates from a Calvinistic a priori of Effectual Grace, for lack of biblical warrant, it is also a departure from a semi-Pelagian a priori, which confesses that a person must make the first move toward God in order for Him to move towards him or her. Failing to distinguish between a semi-Pelagian view of Grace and the Classical Arminian view is nothing short of calumny.

THE ARMINIAN CONFESSION OF 1621: THE REMONSTRANTS ON ELECTION

On the benefits and promises of God, and principally of election to grace, or calling to faith. The Remonstrants (followers of Arminius) write:

"1. But that man may not just perform the commandments of God thus far explained, but also willingly want to perform them from the mind, God willed for his part to do everything necessary for effecting both in man (a), that is, he determined to confer such grace to sinful man by which he might be suitable and apt to render everything which is required of him in the gospel, and even more, to promise such good things to him, whose excellence and beauty might far exceed the capacity of human understanding, and that the desire and certain hope of this might kindle and inflame the will of man to render obedience in acts to him.

"Indeed, God habitually both makes known and bestows all these benefits to us by his Holy Spirit (b) (about which we have declared more fully above).

(a) Jer. 31:32-34, Heb. 8:8ff, Ez. 11:19 & 36:22, 2 Cor. 7:1, 2 Pet. 1:3-4, 1 John 3, Col. 1:4-5, 1 Pet. 1:3-4. (b) 1 Cor. 2:10, 12:3ff, 1 John 2:20, 27, Rom. 5:5, 8-9.

"2. Therefore, in the firs place, when God calls sinners to himself through the gospel and seriously commands faith and obedience either under the promise of eternal life, or to the contrary, under the threat of eternal death, he not only bestows necessary but also sufficient grace for sinners to render faith and obedience (a).

"This calling is sometimes called election in Scriptures, namely, to grace as the means of salvation, very different from election to glory or to salvation itself (b); more on this below.

"This calling, however, is effected and executed by the preaching of the gospel (c), together with the power of the Spirit, and that certainly with a gracious and serious intention to save and so to bring to faith all those who are called (d), whether they really believe and are saved or not, and so obstinately refuse to believe and be saved.

(a) Matt. 11:20, John 5:34, 40 & 6:44-45, 2 Pet. 1:2-3. (b) 1 Cor. 1:26, 2 Tim. 1:9, 1 Pet. 2:9. (c) Matt. 28:18, John 5:34, Rom. 10:14-15, 2 Cor. 3:5-6. (d) 1 Tim. 2:4ff., Tit. 2:11, 1 Pet. 1:23, 25.

"3. For there is one calling that is effective (a), so called because it attains its saving effect from the event rather than from the sole intention of God. Indeed, it [is] not administered by some special and hidden wisdom of God from an absolute intention of saving, so as to fruitfully unite with the will of the one who is called, nor so that by it the will of the one who is called is so efficaciously determined to believe through an irresistible power or some omnipotent force (b) (which is nothing less than creation, or raising from the dead) that he could not but believe and obey, but because it is not resisted by the one who is now called and sufficiently prepared by God, nor is a barrier placed against divine grace which otherwise was able to be placed by him.

"Indeed there is another which is sufficient, but nevertheless ineffective (c), namely, which on man's part is without saving effect and through the will and avoidable fault of man alone it is unfruitful, or does not attain its desired and due effect.

(a) Rom. 8:28-29, 1 Cor. 1:24, 26. (b) Acts 2:4, 13, 48, Rom. 6:17, 1 Thess. 2:13. (c) Prov. 1:24-25, Ez. 12:1, Is. 5:1ff., Matt. 23:37, Luke 7:30, John 5:40, Acts 7:5 & 13:46, 2 Thess. 3:1-2, contrary to the Canons of the Synod of Dort, chs. 3 & 4.

"4. The former, when either joined with its saving effect or already constituted by its exercised act, is sometimes called in Scripture conversion (a), regeneration (b), a spiritual rising from the dead (c) and a new creation (d), clearly because by it we are efficaciously turned from a corrupt style of living (e) to live justly, soberly and godly (f), and are raised on a heavenly account from a death of sin or a deadly custom of sinning to a spiritual life or holy way of living.

"And finally, being reformed by the spiritual effectiveness of the Word according to the image first of the teaching and then of the life of Christ, it is as if we were born again (g) and made new creatures through repentance and true faith (h).

(a) Acts 3:19, 26, 1 Thess. 1:9. (b) John 3:5ff., Ja. 1:18. (c) Eph. 2:6. (d) Gal. 4:19, 2 Cor. 5:17, Eph. 2:10. (e) Tit. 2:11-12. (f) Rom. 6:2ff. (g) Rom. 6:17. (h) Eph. 2:24, Col. 3:10.

"5. Man therefore does not have saving faith from himself (a), nor is he regenerated or converted by the powers of his own free will, seeing that in the state of sin he cannot of himself or by himself either think or will or do anything that is good enough to be saved (b) (of which first of all is conversion and saving faith), but it is necessary that he be regenerated [prevenient, awakening grace] and totally renewed by God, in Christ, through the word of the gospel joined with the power of the Holy Spirit (c), namely, in his understanding, affections, will and all his strengths, that he may be able to understand, meditate on, will and finish correctly these things that are savingly good.

(a) Matt. 11:17, 13:11, & 16:17ff. (b) Matt. 7:17 & 12:34, John 6:44-45, 65 & 3:5. (c) Phil. 1:5-6 & 2:13, Eph. 2:1ff., Ja. 1:17-18, 1 Pet. 1:23.

"6. We think therefore that the grace of God is the beginning (a), progress (b) and completion of all good (c), so that not even a regenerate man himself can, without this preceding or preventing [prevenient], exciting, following and cooperating grace, think, will, or finish any good thing to be saved (d), much less resist any attractions and temptations to evil.

"Thus faith, conversion, and all good works, and all godly and saving actions which are able to be thought, are to be ascribed solidly to the grace of God in Christ as their principal and primary cause.

(a) Eph. 2:5, 18, Titus 2:11-13 & 3:4-5, Phil. 1:6. (b) John 15:5, 1Cor. 1:4ff. (c) 1 Thess. 5:23-24, Eph. 6:13. (d) Matt. 26:41, 1 Cor. 10:13, 2:4ff.

"7. Yet a man may despise and reject the grace of God (a) and resist its operation, so that when he is divinely called to faith and obedience, he is able to render himself unfit to believe and obey the divine will, and that by his own true and conquerable fault, either by secure carelessness (b), or blind prejudice (c), or thoughtless zeal (d), or an inordinate love of the world (e) or of himself (f), or other inciting causes of that kind.

"For such an irresistible grace or force, which, as to its effectiveness, is no less than creation, nor generation properly called, nor raising from the dead (and causes the very act of faith and obedience in such a way that, being granted, a man cannot not believe or obey) certainly cannot be but ineptly and foolishly applied where free obedience is seriously commanded, and that under the promise of vast reward if performed and the threat of the gravest punishment if neglected.

"For in vain he commands this obedience and requires it of another, and without cause promises to reward the obedience, who himself alone both ought and wills to cause the very act of obedience by such a force as cannot be resisted. And it is silly and irrational to reward someone as truly obedient in whom this very obedience was caused through such an alien power.

"And finally, punishment, especially eternal, is unjustly and cruelly inflicted on him as disobedient by whom this obedience was not performed solely through the absence of that irresistible and truly necessary grace, who really is not disobedient.

"We cannot here state how everywhere in the Scriptures it is affirmed of some, that they resisted the Holy Spirit (g), that they judged, or rather made themselves unworthy of eternal life (h), that they made void the counsel of God concerning themselves (i); that they would not hear (j), come (k), obey (l), that they closed their ears (m) and hardened their hearts (n), etc.

"And of others, that they promptly and freely believed (o), that they obeyed the truth and the faith, that they showed themselves attentive and teachable, that were attentive to the evangelical doctrine (p), that received the Word of God with cheerfulness, and that they were more generous in this than those who rejected the same, and finally, lastly, that obeyed the truth, or the Gospel, from the heart, etc.

"To attribute all this to those who in no way can either believe or obey, or cannot believe and obey when they are called, is very certainly foolish, and plainly ridiculous.

(a) Ez. 12:2, Prov. 1:24-25, Matt. 13:19 & 23:27, Acts 7:51 & 13:46. (b) Matt. 13:19. (c) John 7:3-5, 51. (d) 2 Cor. 3:13, Rom. 10:2-3. (e) Luke 14:18. (f) John 5:44. (g) 2 Cor. 4:4, 2 Thess. 3:2, 2 Tim. 3:2ff, 1 John 5:4ff. (h) Acts 7:51 (i) Acts 13:46. (j) Luke 7:30. (k) Prov. 1:24-25. (l) John 5:40. (m) Acts 7:39. (n) Zech. 7:11-13, Jer. 5:3. (o) Acts 28:24, Heb. 3:12-13 & 4:2, Ps. 95:7-8. (p) Acts 2:41, 13:47, 6:7 & 17:11, Rom. 6:17, 1 Pet. 1:22.

"8. And even if there truly is the greatest disparity of grace (a), clearly according to the most free dispensation of the divine will, still the Holy Spirit confers such grace to all (b), both in general and in particular, to whom the Word of faith is ordinarily preached, as is sufficient for begetting faith in them, and for gradually carrying on their saving conversion.

"And therefore sufficient grace for faith and conversion not only comes to those who actually believe and are converted, but also to those who do not believe and are not really converted (c). For whoever God calls to faith and salvation, he calls them seriously (d), that is, not only by an external show, or in words alone (that is, when his serious commandments and promises are declared to those that are called in general) but also with a sincere and unfeigned intention of saving them and the will of converting them.

"Thus he never willed any prior decree of absolute reprobation or undeserved blinding or hardening concerning them.

(a) Rom. 12:6ff, 1 Pet. 4:10. (b) Matt. 11:21, Titus 3:4ff., 1 Pet. 1:23 & 2:9, Ja. 1:18, 2 Cor. 3:6, Heb. 4:12. (c) Is. 62:2, Ez. 18:11, Prov. 1:24ff., Matt. 23:37, Luke 8:12. (d) Tit. 2:11-12, 2 Tim. 1:9, 2 Cor. 5:20 & 6:1ff., Is. 5:2ff., Ps. 85:13-14, John 5:34 & 10:10."

The Arminian Confession of 1621, trans. and ed. Mark Ellis (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2005), 105-110.

CLASSICAL ARMINIANS: LOVERS OF FREE GRACE

Too many are of the opinion that Arminians are defenders and lovers of Free Will when the truth of the matter is quite another: Classical Arminians are lovers of Free Grace. They consistently, as did Arminius himself, assert that mankind has a measure of free will (in the libertarian sense), in order to remain biblical, and also to avoid the heresy that God is the author of evil. Since God "cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone" (James 1:13 TNIV), it is only right and biblical to contend that God is not responsible for evil and that human beings have genuine options and make genuine choices.

The concept that the grace of God is resistible comes from the apostle Paul, who writes: "And working together with Him, we also urge you not to receive the grace of God in vain" (2 Cor. 6:1 NASB, et al.). If receiving God's grace was irresistible then this statement of Paul's is quite fallacious. Concerning grace and free will, Arminius writes:

This is my opinion concerning the Free-Will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him: Yet none of these acts could he do except though the assistance of Divine Grace.
But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers [more on this below], by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.¹

The "true good" of which Arminius speaks is faith in Christ Jesus and in God. This cannot be accomplished of and by mankind alone, without the grace and operation of God, through the Holy Spirit. This sets Classical Arminianism apart from Semi-Pelagianism, which teaches that a person must make the first move toward God, and that if he or she does so then God will act accordingly with grace. Classical Arminians attest that God must first act by grace before anyone may respond with his or her will. Roger Olson writes:

Contrary to popular opinion, Arminius did not begin with free will and work his way to conditional election or resistible grace. Rather, his basic theological impulse is absolute: commitment to God's goodness. His theology is Christocentric; Jesus Christ is our best clue to the character of God, and in him God is revealed as compassionate, merciful, loving and just. . . .
Arminius's commitment to divine goodness appears especially in his responses to Calvinists William Perkins and Franciscus Gomarus. Arminius's most basic guiding principle in these debates is that God is necessarily and by nature good; God's goodness controls God's power. And God's goodness and glory are inseparable; God is glorified precisely in revealing his goodness in creation and redemption.²

What many theologians attempt is defining (some, redefining) goodness. For example, would it be good of God to unconditionally reprobate the majority of mankind, refusing to save them by a mere decree? If so, then the Bible must teach such an intimation somewhere within its pages. But before we go in search of a proof-text, the following question should be asked: Why would this be a good thing? To what good purpose would damning the majority of humanity to an eternal hell by a mere decree serve? The only viable explanation would be that somehow God needed to damn them merely by a decree. And if God needs anything then His aseity is at stake (His self-sufficiency ~ God does not need anything, cf. Acts 17:25).

Calvinists comb through Romans 9 with an entirely different (think unbiblical) hermeneutic than should the biblical Christian. They stumble over Paul's statement, "What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? (Rom. 9:22 NASB), and conclude that God has by decree foreordained to elect a (relatively) small number of human beings unto salvation, reprobating (damning) the majority unconditionally unto hell. But is that what Paul was teaching at Romans 9:22?

Is it true that God is willing to demonstrate His wrath? Absolutely! It is the highest offense to sin against such a holy God. And only in union with and faith in His Son, Jesus Christ, can that wrath be removed (cf. John 3:36; Rom. 5:1; 8:1). Is it true that God is willing to make His power known? Absolutely! His power attests to His authority, and He retains the authority to "destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28) of those who refuse to trust in Jesus, for this is what He Himself has established.

Paul also notes that God has "endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction". First, notice that these vessels were not prepared beforehand (cf. Rom. 9:23) for destruction, as in reprobated from eternity past by decree. Second, remember that "the riches of His kindness and tolerance and patience" are intended to lead one unto repentance (Rom. 2:4). Though Calvinists find it convenient to isolate certain passages of Scripture in order to contort them into corroborating with their theology, the careful student takes the whole composition of Scripture, comparing Scripture with Scripture, to formulate his or her doctrine. This verse does not teach unconditional reprobation by decree unto the glory of God. But one will never convince the Calvinist of such.

Does God know who are the elect and who are the reprobate? Of course He does. How does He know such things? Arminius answers: "God foreknows future things through the infinity of His essence, and through the pre-eminent perfection of His understanding and prescience, not as He willed or decreed that they should necessarily be done; though He would not foreknow them except as they were future, and they would not be future unless God had decreed either to perform or to permit them."³

If the Christian is to maintain that God is good, then he or she cannot advance the cause of Calvinism with any biblical warrant. Olson writes:

Arminius could abide no hint of arbitrariness or injustice in God because of God's revelation of his character in Jesus Christ, and this revelation does not hide a dark, hidden God who secretly wills the destruction of the wicked ~ except when they voluntarily choose their wickedness in free resistance to the grace of God. . . . To put it bluntly, for Arminius, God could not foreordain or directly or indirectly cause sin and evil if he wanted to (which he would not), because that would make God the author of sin. And God's good and just nature requires that he desires the salvation of every human being. This is completely consistent with Scripture (1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9).⁴

That mankind has been corrupted by the Fall is substantiated throughout Arminius's Works. But Arminius also insists that fallen man needs to be "regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers" if he or she is to believe in Christ Jesus. Was Arminius suggesting that regeneration precedes faith? No. Arminius writes:

Besides, even true and living faith in Christ precedes regeneration strictly taken, and consisting of the mortification or death of the old man, and the vivification of the new man . . . For Christ becomes ours by faith, and we are engrafted into Christ, are made members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones, and, being thus planted with Him, we coalesce or are united together, that we may draw from Him the vivifying power of the Holy Spirit, by which power the old man is mortified and we rise again into a new life.⁵

When a person is being convicted of his or her sins by the Holy Spirit (cf. John 16:8-11), and is thus being graced by God in this monergistic operation, the end goal is faith in Christ Jesus and complete regeneration. Arminius uses the word regeneration to refer to the whole convicting (enabling, awakening, if you will) process. Thus if the person under conviction resists God's active grace (cf. 2 Cor. 6:1), regeneration proper will not be completed, though that word (completed) is used loosely.

However, if one does not resist the operative grace of God, but believes in Jesus Christ, then he or she is gloriously saved (i.e. regenerated, cf. Titus 3:5). Regeneration and salvation are two sides of the same coin, if you will. Paul explains that God "saved us . . . by the washing of regeneration and renewing by the Holy Spirit . . . through Jesus Christ our Savior" (Titus 3:5-6 NASB). And it is only through Jesus Christ that one may be saved and regenerated; and that, only by faith in Him (cf. Acts 4:12; John 14:6).

In spite of Calvinism's philosophical theology, which declares that God has by decree secretly elected to unconditionally save a remnant of humanity, sending His Son to only atone for their sins on the cross, drawing only them unto His Son by the Holy Spirit, Scripture itself confronts such an aberration: "Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and patience, not realizing that God's kindness is intended to lead you to repentance?" (Rom. 2:4 TNIV); and also, "Rid yourselves of all the offenses you have committed, and get a new heart and a new spirit. Why will you die, house of Israel? For I take no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Sovereign LORD. Repent and live!" (Ezekiel 18:31-32 TNIV)

Repent and live. The Words of God: the heart and character of God revealed within.

1 James Arminius, "A Declaration of the Sentiments of Arminius," The Works of Arminius, Vol. I, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker House, 1986), 659-60.

2 Roger E. Olson, Arminius Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2006), 102-03.

3 Arminius, "Certain Articles to be Diligently Examined and Weighed," Works, 2:207.

4 Olson, 103.

5 Arminius, Works, Wesleyan Heritage Collection, 2:233.

CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM ON LIBERTARIAN ACTION THEORY

Gene M. Bridges, one of the bloggers at Triablogue, challenged me to, as he put it, "provide a biblical account for [Libertarian Free Will]. Put another way, in case the words are too big for you - where does the Bible teach libertarian action theory?"

First, one definition of Libertarian Free Will (the typical Arminian view) is, "the position that a person is equally able to make choices between options independent of pressures or constraints from external or internal causes. In other words, the person is able to equally choose between any set of options" (quoted from CARM). This definition, however, is not entirely accurate. An Arminian friend of mine notes:

Libertarian Free Will does not hold that a person is equally able to make choices between options, but that he is able to choose between options. His ability to choose need not be equal, simply that there be a genuine abilty to possible options.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the best view of Libertarian Free Will does not hold that we make choices independent of pressures or constraints from external or internal causes. We make choices with influence from all sorts of pressures from external or internal causes, it is just that none of those are irresistible when we are free. Put differently, we make choices with resistble influence from all sorts of pressures from external or internal causes. Constraint might be a different thing. One would think constraint does act irresistibly, and so precludes freedom, at least if one is constrained to do something or act in some way. On the other hand, constraint could be applied at the level of limiting options. But if one is free, there must be at least two possible options.

Though our will has been affected by our sin nature, it still retains the ability to choose contrary to our nature and desires. Our sin nature influences our desires, but does not determine what we shall choose to perform, nor does God determine what we shall choose. Otherwise, clearly, God would be responsible for our sin.

Second, we contrast this view with Compatibilist Free Will (the typical Calvinistic, Soft Determinist, view, as opposed to the Hard Determinist position, which vies for God strictly determining every action) as the position "that a person can choose only that which is consistent with his nature and that there are constraints and influences upon his ability to choose" (also quoted from CARM). Arminians agree with the latter notion, for certainly humanity's sinful nature "influences" one's ability to choose.

However, human beings often choose that which is inconsistent with their nature. Though total depravity is true, in that every part of human beings has been effected by the Fall, this state has not rendered them incapable of choosing to do a measure of good (though, obviously, not meritorious unto salvation). The Compatibilist disagrees. CARM explains what this view maintains: "Free will is affected by human nature but cannot choose contrary to our nature and desires." Jesus admits just the opposite in Luke 11:13: you then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children. If human beings are completely sinful and cannot choose contrary to their nature, then how can they know how to give good gifts to their children? Would not their sin nature determine not to give anything good to their children, since they are utterly sinful, selfish and self-centered?

On a related matter, when asked why in Classical Arminian theology some people believe and others do not believe in Jesus Christ for salvation, I responded that only God fully knows that answer. Bridges remarks: "No, God doesn't know, according to libertarian action theory [which is false]. How can God know an indeterminate action without it being instantiated?" Thus for the Calvinist God cannot foreknow anything which He has not already predetermined to happen (by a mere decree). Does this not limit His ability to foreknow? Yes, it does. And does this not libel God as the instantiator of evil? Yes, it does. The latter is undeniably heretical.

When God decreed to create the universe and all of the creatures which He had foreordained to exist, was there anything about them which He could foreknow or foresee? Since Classical Arminians reject Open Theism, maintaining that God makes known the end from the beginning, saying, "My purpose will stand, and I will do all that I please" (Isa. 46:10), we think that God foreknew everything there was to know about every individual, not by decree but by real foreknowledge of each individual. God told Jeremiah, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, before you were born I set you apart; I anointed you as a prophet to the nations" (Jer. 1:5 TNIV). Incidentally, God also foreknew believers and predetermined to conform them to the image of His Son (Rom. 8:29).

God determined that Jeremiah would be sanctified and anointed as a prophet before he was ever born. Question: Did Jeremiah ever sin? Answer: All Christians concede that he in fact did sin, for only Christ Jesus was ever sinless. Question: Who determined or caused Jeremiah to sin? Answer: Jeremiah. Calvinists are tireless in their efforts to put mankind in his sinful place, rightly so, insisting that man freely sins. And yet they also maintain that Libertarian Free Will is not true. If sinful man freely sins, then he sins in the Libertarian sense. Calvinists demand that man freely sins but that libertarian free will is unbiblical. This is no antinomy, friends. This is a contradiction.

God is sovereign. We heartily recognize that and champion His cause. And we may do so because we trust that He will always act in accordance with His holy and just nature. God cannot perform, initiate, or cause evil. Yet, God is soverign still. The Psamist declares: "For You formed my inward parts; You wove me in my mother's womb . . . Your eyes have seen my unformed substance; and in Your book were all written the days that were ordained for me, when as yet there was not one of them" (Ps. 139:13, 16 NASB). Again, God is sovereign. Arminius confesses: "But the dominion of God is the right of the Creator, and His power over the creatures; according to which He has them as His own property, and can command and use them, and do about them whatever the relation of creation, and the equity which rests upon it, permit."¹ Again, we believe strongly in God's sovereignty over His creatures and we trust Him to always do right, for He is righteous. He can do no wrong. Arminius further instructs:

For the right [of God to act in His sovereignty] cannot extend further than is allowed by that cause from which the whole of it arises, and on which it is dependent: For this reason it is not agreeable to this right of God, either that He delivers up His creature to another who may domineer over such creature at His arbitrary pleasure, so that he be not compelled to render to God an account of the exercise of His sovereignty, and be able without any demerit on the part of the creature to inflict every evil on a creature capable of injury, or, at least, not for any good of this creature; or that He command an act to be done by the creature for the performance of which he neither has nor can have sufficient and necessary powers; or that He employ the creature to introduce sin into the world, that He may, by punishing or by forgiving it, promote His own glory; or, lastly, to do concerning the creature whatever He is able according to His absolute power to do concerning him, that is, eternally to punish or to afflict him, without [his having committed] sin.²

What I was asked by Gene Bridges was to put forward a biblical model for Libertarian Action Theory. Truth be told, no amount of Scripture (though the tenor of both Old and New Testaments account for the truth) will convince Bridges or any other Calvinist that human beings actually make their own choices, for this assertion (somehow) demeans the sovereignty of God. In the Calvinistic order, God cannot be sovereign unless He has predetermined by decree (and not by simple foreknowledge) every action that a human being chooses (which is quite a misnomer, since in their scheme God is the one who "chooses" for human beings to "choose" a certain course). But I digress.

Nevertheless, let us begin at the beginning. After the Fall of Adam and Eve, it is clear that their offspring, Cain and Abel, exercised libertarian free will. It is clear from Scripture that Adam made some free will decisions, as did Abel, which were not necessarily motivated by sin, though sin had already tainted his nature. For example, Abel freely brought a suitable offering to the LORD (Gen. 4:4a), which He accepted (Gen. 4:4b). This free-will offering did not emerge from his sinful nature. Cain, too, freely brought an offering to the LORD (Gen. 4:3a), but it was not accepted by Him (Gen. 4:5).

Now, if the Calvinist's position is correct, and all sinners, as John Calvin puts it, "without reason . . . follows the bent of his nature like the lower animals . . ."³ then did Abel's sinful nature cause or contribute to his bringing an acceptable offering to the LORD? No, sin cannot cause someone to do something acceptable to the LORD. Well, if sin was not the cause for this act, and God was not the direct cause of this act, then what option are we left with but a Libertarian Free Will position? If, as Calvin insists, "the whole man is subject to the dominion of sin, surely the will . . . must be bound with the closest chains,"⁴ then we are forced to ask how it is that this will can do anything other than sin, and why man is not as bad as he could be?

If God causes or has predetermined for a man to behave in a wicked manner then He would be unjust in condemning him for carrying out wickedness. Yet this is the picture that Calvinists paint of the God of the Bible. I cannot push a man down a flight of stairs and then blame him for falling. Yet, this is the Calvinist's answer to why wicked men act wickedly. They do so because God has by decree predetermined it thus.

While it is true that our choices are never entirely free from the effect of sin on the human nature, it is also true that many of our choices are not directly related to the effect of sin (as Abel demonstrated in Genesis 4, as well as is demonstrated by a plethora of examples throughout the entire Bible). Man is called a "slave" to sin (John 8:34); but even slaves exhibit some measure of freedom. And even as "slaves of Christ" (Eph. 6:6), many believers still exercise freedom to disobey their Master.

When Arminians vie for a libertarian free will, they are merely stating that God is not the One behind their choices. People may freely choose to do that which they will. At this point, the Calvinist will insist that due to man's bondage to sin, he can only perform that which is commensurate with his nature (or desire, which is sinful). If that were the case, however, strictly speaking, then man would be as bad as he could be, and we know that that is not the case. Thus the will must be distinguished from desire, as much as the definition of the will itself is not merely "the power to choose." This was Jonathan Edwards' Achilles heel. Daniel Whedon writes:

The definition of Edwards, that Will is "the power to choose," is on his own principle manifestly defective. It has the objection Edwards brings against another definition, namely, that it needs definition as much as the term to be defined. Choose is a word as obscure as Will. In fact, if the definition is true, then to choose is to will; and the definition is no more than saying that the Will is the power to will, which is about the same as defining a thing by itself. . . .
We define Will to be that power of the soul by which it intentionally originates an act or state of being. Or more precisely, Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act. And this definition furnishes a complete demonstration that the Will is a clearly different faculty from any other in the mind; for it is always distinguished and characterized by the intention, and also, as we shall hereafter note, by motive. Volition, indeed, might be defined as that act of the mind that it performs with intention. . . .
Edwards and the older necessitarians held volition to be the same as desire, or at least to be included generically under it. This assumption would settle the question of necessity, inasmuch as it is by all conceded that desires are in nature necessary; while, on the other hand, modern concession of the difference of the two is no surrender of the necessity of Will. . . .
Desire, be it ever so intense, never becomes volition, but by a distinct movement known to consciousness; and no action can follow until volition arises. Desire is uneasy and a stimulant; Will is decisive, and brings all the mind to acquiescence. Yet volition, like desire, is appetite and preference; it is a conscious free act of fixing a settlement upon its object, to which it brings the unity of the man.⁵

God has allowed man libertarian free will. Man can make his own decisions, and he will be held accountable for those decisions, because God is also just: He will judge all of mankind on the Day of Reckoning. He will hold each and every person accountable for everything which he did while in the body. And He can do so because He did not, in any way, shape, or form cause, predetermine, plan, or foreordain any evil which any man ever committed merely by an arbitrary decree, yet He foreknew what every person would freely choose to do.

We live in a Free Will / Creation-Order theodicy. While God remains sovereign (for how could he not?), He has granted man freedom of choice. And He will hold man accountable for his choices. The fact that God foreknows our future free will choices does not denigrate from the fact of genuine options one has from which to choose. I had the option of whether or not to construct this post. I could have chosen to post on many other topics. I freely chose this topic and God foreknew that I would. The fact that God foreknew that I would post on this topic today did not mean that I had no other option.

Though our nature has been tainted by sin, it has not been eradicated by sin (as though huamns are nothing more than robots or automata), nor has it been consumed by sin. This is why we still have the libertarian freedom to choose, or to will. If the fact were otherwise, then sinners could do nothing but sin; they could only do evil every second of every day. The wickedness, perversion, hatred and violence that sin produces would permeate our society at every given moment. And let us be reminded that sin or evil is not an entity. Evil is merely the privation of good. We lost that goodness in the Garden when Adam sinned. What we are left with is a void of that original goodness (or righteousness). This is why we need Christ's righteousness in order to be justified before God (Rom. 3:21-26).

Justo Gonzalez, commenting on Augustine's conflict with the deterministic Manichees (a near modern day Calvinistic philosophy), writes:

The question of the freedom of the will was of particular importance in the polemics against the Manichees. They held that everything was predetermined, and that human beings had no freedom [just like modern day Calvinists!]. Against such views, Augustine became the champion of the freedom of the will. According to him, human freedom is such that it is its own cause. When we act freely, we are not moved by something either outside or inside us, as by a necessity, but rather by our own will. A decision is free inasmuch as it is not the product of nature, but of the will itself. Naturally, this does not mean that circumstances do not influence our decisions. What it does mean is that only that which we decide out of our will, and not out of circumstance or out of an inner necessity, is properly called free.⁶

Desire, inclination, dispositions, preferences, sin, temptation, indifference, all of these play a part in our decision making. They do not, however, determine what we will to do. The will is not desire, so the will is not controlled by desire. The will is not sin, so the will is not controlled by sin. The will is not being driven either by Satan or by God, as Luther erroneously taught.

As I was reminded by an Arminian friend, being a slave to sin no more guarantees that the sinner can only sin (and never do anything good, respectfully) than it does a slave of righteousness can only act righteously. Sometimes sinners do good things (not meritoriously, obviously), and at other times Christians do sinful, evil things. Though the born again child of God has a "new nature" in Christ (2 Cor. 5:17), he may still will to do something contrary to that nature. And when a sinner does something good, he does so (willingly) contrary to his (sinful) nature.

To suggest that the sinner only does something good due to the Common Grace of God opens up a different can of worms that must be dealt with at a later date. For now, suffice to say, fallen human beings exercise libertarian free will. The Calvinist's Hard Determinist position has more in common with Manichaeism and Greek Pagan religion than it does Christian teaching. And the Calvinist's Soft Determinism (Compatibilist) view tries to maintain a balance between man's free will and God's sovereignty. However, by "God's sovereignty," they differ very little from the Hard Determinist's position, and the balance ends up tipping in the erroneous view of God's "absolute sovereignty," a perversion of the term sovereign. Thus, they are forced to appeal to antinomy. Before long, there is so much mystery and antinomy in their system, it is hard to truly know much about God.

1 James Arminius, "On the Lordship or Dominion of God," from The Works of Arminius, Vol. II, Disputation XXVII, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 365.

2 Ibid.

3 Dave Hunt and James White, Debating Calvinism (Sisters, OR: Multnomah, 2004), 342.

4 Ibid.

5 Daniel D. Whedon, Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan Response to Jonathan Edwards, ed. John D. Wagner (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009), 4-5.

6 Justo L. Gonzalez, The Story of Christianity, Vol. I (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984), 213.

SATURDAY DEVOTION: ARMINIUS "ON THE PERFECTION OF THE SCRIPTURES"

We denominate that which comprehends all things necessary for the Church to know, to believe, to do and to hope, in order to salvation, "The Perfection of the Sacred Scriptures."

As we are about to engage in the defense of this perfection against inspirations, visions, dreams, and other novel enthusiastic things, we assert that since the time when Christ and His apostles sojourned on earth, no inspiration of any thing necessary for the salvation of any indiviudal man or of the Church has been given to any single person or to any congregation of men whatsoever, which thing is not in a full and most perfect manner comprised in the Sacred Scriptures.

We do likewise affirm that in the latter ages no doctrine necessary to salvation has been deduced from these Scriptures which was not explicitly known and believed from the very commencement of the Christian Church. For, from the time of Christ's ascent into heaven, the Church of God was in an adult state, being capable indeed of increasing in the knowledge and belief of things necessary to salvation, but not capable of receiving accessions of new articles: That is, she was capable of increase in that faith by which the articles of religion are believed, but not in that faith which is the subject of belief.

Whatever additions have since been made, they obtain only the rank of interpretations and proofs, which ought themselves not to be at variance with the Scriptures, but to be deduced from them; otherwise no authority is due to them, but they should rather be considered as allied to error: For the perfection, not only of the propositions, but likewise of the explanations and proofs, which are comprised in the Scriptures, is very great.

But the most compendious way of forming a judgment about any enunciation or proposition is to discern whether its subject and predicate be either expressly or with equal force contained in the Scriptures: If neither the one nor the other be contained in them, that proposition may be rejected at least as not necessary to salvation, without any detriment to one's salvation. But the predicate may be of such a kind that when ascribed to this subject, it cannot be received without detriment to salvation . . . .

James Arminius, "Seventy-Nine Private Disputations: Disputation VII. On the Perfection of the Scriptures," in The Works of Arminius, Vol. II, trans. James Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 326-7.

ARMINIUS ON THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AND WILL

Once again, Calvinist Richard A. Muller guides us in Arminius's understanding of God's Divine Knowledge and Will. He writes:

Arminius' intellectualism is evident from the first in his definition of the scientia Dei [mind of God] as the faculty of the divine life that is "first in nature and in order." The divine will, in other words, as "the second faculty" of the divine life, is not merely placed second in order for the sake of discussion: it is placed second because it "follows the divine intellect and is produced from it."
It is, thus, by the divine will that God is inwardly directed "toward a known good." (Nor is Arminius' intellectualism confined to his doctrine of God: he assumes the priority of the intellect over the will in human beings also, both in their primitive condition before the fall and in their fallen condition as well. This latter point stands in contrast to the Reformed, who, following Calvin, were typcially philosophical intellectualists and soteriological voluntarists, who placed the will over the intellect in the fallen nature of man. The point also, significantly, stands in some contrast with Aquinas' teaching ~ insofar as it represents a more thoroughgoing intellectualism, indeed, an intellecutalism tinged with rationalism. Aquinas had assumed that the indirect character of the knowledge of God available in the temporal order rendered the knowledge of God available to the viator less perfect than the love of God which, even in this life, wills God directly. In Coplestons' words, "in the beatific vision in heaven, . . . when the soul sees the essence of God immediately, the intrinsic superiority of intellect to will reasserts itself." Arminius grants a higher status to mediate knowlege of God than does Aquinas ~ or, perhaps, a lower status to temporal human willing ~ with the result that intellect remains higher than will or love in the fallen condition.)
From the tradition in general and from the scholastic theology both of the Middle Ages and of early orthodox Protestantism, Arminius draws out a doctrine of divine omniscience. The intellectus Dei [knowledge of God], like all other predicates of the divine nature, partakes of the simplicity, infinity, and eternity or simultaneous wholeness of the divine essence. Although it is a faculty of the divine life . . . it is eternally fully actualized.
The intellectus Dei, therefore, is an eternal knowledge of "all things and every thing which now have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, any kind of being." Even so, God does not merely know things but also the order and relation of all things.
Arminius extends this divine knowledge even to purely rational "things" ~ to concepts and relations ~ that exist only in the imagination. It ought to go without saying that this kind of intensely speculative argumentation, though quite typical of scholastic theology and philosophy, has no parallel in the thought of the Reformers . . . .
This utter omniscience can be further described as a total self-knowledge, a complete knowledge of all possibility, and an absolute knowledge of all actuality. God, therefore, can be said to know himself absolutely . . . Granting this infinite self-identical self-knowledge and granting also that God is the first cause of all things, God must know all possibility and all actuality (which is to say, all actualized possibility) and know these catagories exhaustively . . . .

Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991), 145-147.

JACOB ARMINIUS' CONTRIBUTION TO A THEOLOGY OF GRACE (PART TWO)

This is the continuance of the subject of Arminius' contribution to a theology of grace, which began yesterday. Lake writes:

His first real problems began in 1591 over his interpretation of Romans 7; however, he was able to gain the support of the city fathers, and so triumphed over his opponents. It should also be pointed out that a staunch Calvinism had not as yet been able to establish itself in Amsterdam.
Some have accused Arminius of having been influenced by Luther, but there is little in his writings to reveal this. He was commissioned to reply critically to the Anabaptists who were finding sanctuary in Holland, but this was an assignment which he never finished. Probably because he may have found some of their views more scriptural than their opponents.
One thing is clear from these events: he never stooped to cheap vulgarities as Luther was often prone to do; his arguments were never vindictive, nor did he take advantage of his opponent's weaker argument by degrading him! [That is a trait we can all imitate.] . . .
One does not have to agree with the particular views espoused by Jacobus Arminius to appreciate his personal participation in the political and economic life of 16th and 17th century Holland . . . What needs to be observed here is that Arminius carried his theological views into the arena of politics. And while he advocated toleration for the Anabaptists, he had no sympathy for their views of political isolationism.
The evidence is not as abundant as the historian would like, but there is sufficient grounds to argue that Arminius participated in these issues because of principle: the principle that the Christian life and Christian theology ought not to be divorced from the mainstream of human life and its social, economic and political consequences.
We cannot predict how Arminius would have viewed later religious and political problems, but in principle he certainly would not have advocated a laissez faire attitude toward political involvement. His consistent defense of religious toleration at the expense of coercion and religious persecution would make him one of the better examples of a religious liberalism that has consistently characterized later Arminianism.
It should be pointed out here that terms such as "conservative" and "liberal" have meaning only when the point of reference is clearly understood. He was nevertheless a defender of religious freedom, and in terms of the rigidity of 16th and 17th century Calvinism, this was a dangerous liberalism!
The works of Arminius in the English three-volume edition now number more than 1700 pages. For one whose professional career as a professor of theology lasted only six years, this is a tremendous legacy. Interestingly enough, most of his writings come from his years as pastor. How much has not been preserved, only the Lord knows! . . .
What is Arminius' uniqueness? What is his distinctive contribution to theology? What is or are his heresy or heresies? The modern reader will probably be impressed with two facts about the writings of Arminius: his theological works involve an intricate logical style and his views do not seem unusual or even problematical, let alone heretical.
The logical and syllogistical style of his theological works strikes the modern reader as being somewhat dry [that's relative]! There is, however, a precision about his works that reveals a keen mind and sensitive perception about the issues of the day. Perhaps the controversy and antagonism surrounding Arminius are to be attributed partly to the soundness of Arminius' style of theological writing.
As one reads only Arminius' side of the controversy and hears the logical nature of his position, one wonders how his opponents could stand against the powerful persuasion of his arguments. It is to be observed, however, that many theological debates are not won or lost on the basis of logical soundness or even biblical soundness! . . .
The silent gaps in his writings indicate how orthodox he was in most points in his theology. This also helps to explain why most of his extant writings are of such a controversial nature: he spent the major part of his life defending those positions found to be most unacceptable to his critics.
There are major areas of theology where we know little or nothing about his views, e.g. eschatology. He was in most points a mild Calvinist . . . His discussions about the sacraments and the church as well as the relationship of the church and state represent a traditional Calvinistic position, with the possible exception that he was more Erastian than Calvin. He was certainly closer to Calvin than he was to Luther, Zwingli or the Anabaptists . . .
It is, however, in the areas of human responsibility, grace, predestination, the extent of the atonement and the perseverance of the saints that Arminius' contribution lies.¹

This concludes Part Two.

1 Donald M. Lake, "Jacob Arminius' Contribution to a Theology of Grace," in Grace Unlimited, ed. Clark Pinnock (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1999), 227-232.